This case involves Apple’s handling of user-uploaded files hosted in private iCloud storage. Instead of adopting PhotoDNA to scan hosted files for CSAM, Apple created its own proprietary alternative, NeuralHash, which apparently wasn’t as good. So Apple U-turned on its...
Apple U-turned on its efforts to scan for CSAM in its cloud storage. Instead, Apple implemented end-to-end encryption for iCloud files.
Those are two entirely unrelated things! Author is making it sound like a conspiracy!
Also author links to apple.fandom.com as a source for NeuralHash. Yes, really.
Forcing Apple to scan for CSAM in iCloud means breaking end-to-end encryption for everyone and all purposes, including: malefactors who would intercept private files for criminal purposes; and government actors who have repeatedly shown that they will break into, distribute, and weaponize privately stored file caches (I was just thinking about the North Korea Sony hack. Remember it?).
Do I even need to say anything here? Besides go fuck yourself (after sending me your passwords), Eric Goldman.
Those are two entirely unrelated things! Author is making it sound like a conspiracy!
Also author links to apple.fandom.com as a source for NeuralHash. Yes, really.
Do I even need to say anything here? Besides go fuck yourself (after sending me your passwords), Eric Goldman.