This case involves Apple’s handling of user-uploaded files hosted in private iCloud storage. Instead of adopting PhotoDNA to scan hosted files for CSAM, Apple created its own proprietary alternative, NeuralHash, which apparently wasn’t as good. So Apple U-turned on its...
Am I the only one that finds it ridiculous, non-E2E encrypted cloud storage isn’t protected from mass-scanning (against opaque cryptographic hashes)? Just because one technically could, and “nothing in the law prevents” a provider from doing so, or a legal basis is explicitly being provided (in case of the EU’s Chat Control), doesn’t mean one should. You’re still preemptively scanning private content, and it should be irrelevant whether or not it’s encrypted.
I’ve frequently criticized Apple in the past, but I can’t do anything other than praising them for dodging this privacy-nightmare; unlike services provided by the likes of Google or Meta, that actively encourage the use of unencrypted options by default, while happily “volunteering” in case of the EU’s Chat Control.
Am I the only one that finds it ridiculous, non-E2E encrypted cloud storage isn’t protected from mass-scanning (against opaque cryptographic hashes)? Just because one technically could, and “nothing in the law prevents” a provider from doing so, or a legal basis is explicitly being provided (in case of the EU’s Chat Control), doesn’t mean one should. You’re still preemptively scanning private content, and it should be irrelevant whether or not it’s encrypted.
I’ve frequently criticized Apple in the past, but I can’t do anything other than praising them for dodging this privacy-nightmare; unlike services provided by the likes of Google or Meta, that actively encourage the use of unencrypted options by default, while happily “volunteering” in case of the EU’s Chat Control.