- cross-posted to:
- privacy@lemmy.ml
37
- cross-posted to:
- privacy@lemmy.ml
Ricky Mondello (@rmondello@hachyderm.io)
hachyderm.ioIf you actually read the “Passkeys are a trap. Do not use them.” post going around, you’ll find a transparent attempt to clumsily string together a conspiracy.
The post is predicated on the idea that a feature of WebAuthn called “attestation”, which is only used in high-assurance and usually corporate scenarios, and usually with physical hardware security keys, will be leveraged to hurt people, somehow.
The post posits that a website like X will bait and switch users: first, you get a passkey. Then, later, scary “attested” passkeys! This simply isn’t possible to do because attestation isn’t supported on the web for mass market, consumer authentication.
Attestation for passkeys (software-based, syncable credentials) is antithetical to their mass market goals, and would freeze out independent, non-corporate-backed credential managers. It’s an explicit non-goal of the designers of passkeys, who work together in a forum anyone can join.
And trust me, websites and apps like banks repeatedly asked for attestation at the beginning of the industry’s passkey journey. The platforms, browsers, and credential management apps have held firm that the goal of passkeys is reducing phishing and **not** some kind of trusted computing scheme. (And I will note: over my dead body!)
Besides the theory of the case being fundamentally wrong, there are several things that make the post disqualifying in terms of arguing something useful or important in the realm of security, privacy, and user authentication:
1. Intentionally presenting things that are complicated as inherently suspicious. (Delivering security by design can be complicated, yes!)
2. Describing TOTP as a “great solution” for adding security to a password-based account. When the most common threat model on the web is phishing (a word the post never mentions!), TOTP hardly buys you _anything_. TOTP is phishable.
3. Seeming to be unbothered by how many logical leaps are being taken without actually understanding the topic being discussed.
There are bad things happening in tech and untrustworthy people and companies do exist, but they’re largely in the AI space, not the “let’s stop people we love from getting compromised through phishing” space.
Crossposted from https://feddit.org/post/36692057
A rebuttal to an anti-passkey, pro-TOTP post that has made the rounds on Lemmy as well.


Maybe one extra thing you are missing is passkeys are resistant (not proof) to phishing. The user returns an ‘assertion’ that:
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Authentication/Passkeys
It useless to pretend to be the bank as you’ll get an assertion from the user you can’t replay and the user’s passkey implementation should spot the origin is wrong and refuse to sign it anyway (as I understand it).
Maybe? I’d say that TOTP is probably more ‘phishable’ than passkeys - but I doubt there are actual stats on it.
If an end-user is the kind of person that’s fooled by a fake bank website that is on the wrong domain with a sketchy certificate - and approve 2FA requests without much thought - then it is probably likely they’d be fooled by a fake bank website that says, “per our recent updates, [yesterday’s date] is the last date to switch to using an updated web browser. Our bank website is no longer compatible with this web browser, please open one of these browsers [list of any major browser useragent not identified as the current browser] and attempt login again”.
That could either completely bypass their pre-configured bank passkey with legacy login to the fake bank, or the attackers could just pushing them to configure a new passkey to the fake bank on the new browser (the attackers wouls set up a real passkey to the real bank in parallel, using the supplied credentials in the background).
There is certainly proof of concept and examples in the wild of significant cases of people being tricked into approving additional devices with passkeys.