What good will onboard encryption be if the device is seized? They will just figure out how to decrypt.
I guess you’d need to set up asynchronous encrypt / decrypt keys, then move the data encrypted end to end. The target device can do the decrypting, while the bug only does encrypting.
If you ever intend to decrypt the data, don’t you need a decryption key?
I think my point stands, you’d need this device to be only capable of encryption. Otherwise, anyone with access to the device can decrypt it. So it goes without saying, you’d have to push the data to a second device which handles decryption.
You can have an encryption key that can’t decrypt the data. That’s what public and private keys are. The device can have a public key to encrypt the data, and then it can only be decrypted with the attacker’s private key. No need to even get it out of the device, you can also perform the decryption on the same device. Just don’t store the private key in there.
Right, but that’s referring to where the encryption key lives, what kind is used, and how. In the above comment, I’m just stating you need a decryption key.
Earlier I rose that you could store the decryption key on a separate device. I thought 0x0 was contesting that idea as “not how encryption works when l implemented properly.”
Obviously not. Do you store your false equivalency fallacies on the internet in clear text? Apparently so, but I won’t call you stupid for it.
How do passwords get stored? Encrypted.
How do they get read? Decrypted.
What performs the encryption? Keys.
What can the keys be derived from? Passwords.
Where are those keys stored? On the damned device.
Are you telling me, fuck all to the popular mantra that: if they have physical access to device, you’re boned?
State sponsored forensic programs bypass TPM and shit all the time, requiring physical access.
So where is your hypothetical security coming from? To me, it sounds like you’re needlessly giving me a hard time on a subject I probably understand better than you.
A one-way function can make recovering a secret computationally infeasible, but it doesn’t eliminate the implications of allowing the device to decrypt its own data.
I presume you’re referring to a workflow where a password is put into the device, fed through a one way function to derive the key, then the key is used. So the key is derived and never stored on disk.
Nonetheless, your key was in memory. There’s an attack surface for any forensic team. There’s also the capability of trying to brute force the password in a virtual environment after having cloned the device. FBI did this to an iPhone that had full reset after 10 failed attempts.
There’s also the capability to compromise the OS, leave the device there, wait for an admin to come by and supply the password themselves.
I don’t really see how the manner by which you derive your key affects the fact that having the key on device is a vulnerability. It may mitigate the vulnerability but you’re talking about corporations and government entities with practically unlimited budgeting. If the vulnerability exists, it will be explored.
I still think my points stands. It would be stupid for someone committing espionage to allow the same device to also decrypt the data.
What good will onboard encryption be if the device is seized? They will just figure out how to decrypt.
I guess you’d need to set up asynchronous encrypt / decrypt keys, then move the data encrypted end to end. The target device can do the decrypting, while the bug only does encrypting.
Thats not how encryption works when implemented properly
How so?
If you ever intend to decrypt the data, don’t you need a decryption key?
I think my point stands, you’d need this device to be only capable of encryption. Otherwise, anyone with access to the device can decrypt it. So it goes without saying, you’d have to push the data to a second device which handles decryption.
You can have an encryption key that can’t decrypt the data. That’s what public and private keys are. The device can have a public key to encrypt the data, and then it can only be decrypted with the attacker’s private key. No need to even get it out of the device, you can also perform the decryption on the same device. Just don’t store the private key in there.
Right, but that’s referring to where the encryption key lives, what kind is used, and how. In the above comment, I’m just stating you need a decryption key.
Earlier I rose that you could store the decryption key on a separate device. I thought 0x0 was contesting that idea as “not how encryption works when l implemented properly.”
No
Oh… so how do you decrypt your data without a decryption key? Don’t tell me you use a password…
Do you store your password on the device in cleartext? Thats stupid.
Just no, youre plain wrong.
Obviously not. Do you store your false equivalency fallacies on the internet in clear text? Apparently so, but I won’t call you stupid for it.
Are you telling me, fuck all to the popular mantra that: if they have physical access to device, you’re boned?
State sponsored forensic programs bypass TPM and shit all the time, requiring physical access.
So where is your hypothetical security coming from? To me, it sounds like you’re needlessly giving me a hard time on a subject I probably understand better than you.
Sigh
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/One-way_function?wprov=sfla1
A one-way function can make recovering a secret computationally infeasible, but it doesn’t eliminate the implications of allowing the device to decrypt its own data.
I presume you’re referring to a workflow where a password is put into the device, fed through a one way function to derive the key, then the key is used. So the key is derived and never stored on disk.
Nonetheless, your key was in memory. There’s an attack surface for any forensic team. There’s also the capability of trying to brute force the password in a virtual environment after having cloned the device. FBI did this to an iPhone that had full reset after 10 failed attempts.
There’s also the capability to compromise the OS, leave the device there, wait for an admin to come by and supply the password themselves.
I don’t really see how the manner by which you derive your key affects the fact that having the key on device is a vulnerability. It may mitigate the vulnerability but you’re talking about corporations and government entities with practically unlimited budgeting. If the vulnerability exists, it will be explored.
I still think my points stands. It would be stupid for someone committing espionage to allow the same device to also decrypt the data.