Yeah totally fair, thanks for the corrections. I’m not really all that exposed to this field, I was feeling a little frank about the details but I was trying to make a larger point.
TPM can make it infeasible to extract the key, but there’s also the attack surface of bugging the bug. Once access is authorized to encrypted storage, protection depends on what happens outside TPM. That’s one. There’s also the potential to sniff the password, which would be two. They have full access to the device and room, with capacity to wait for the culprit to return for fetching data.
Correct me if I’m wrong but I also think drive encryption with TPM would require that the drive be decrypted while in use. This device wouldn’t be of any value if it weren’t in use, so there’s also that.
It seems like something you can probably count on being secure for something like a home security system. If running an espionage campaign against a trillion dollar company with Uncle Sam in the back pocket, I’d confidently bet against this system.
Not trying to make grandiose claims about the security of TPM. I just think this scenario was a particularly risky adventure — one which could have feasibility been easier to perform with less risk, had the device come with no capability to decrypt its own data.
I’m imagining something that perhaps micro-batches audio through a raw_audio - encrypt -> storage process, but say every 15 seconds or so. Then transport the encrypted data to a device with decryption keys.
Yeah totally fair, thanks for the corrections. I’m not really all that exposed to this field, I was feeling a little frank about the details but I was trying to make a larger point.
TPM can make it infeasible to extract the key, but there’s also the attack surface of bugging the bug. Once access is authorized to encrypted storage, protection depends on what happens outside TPM. That’s one. There’s also the potential to sniff the password, which would be two. They have full access to the device and room, with capacity to wait for the culprit to return for fetching data.
Correct me if I’m wrong but I also think drive encryption with TPM would require that the drive be decrypted while in use. This device wouldn’t be of any value if it weren’t in use, so there’s also that.
It seems like something you can probably count on being secure for something like a home security system. If running an espionage campaign against a trillion dollar company with Uncle Sam in the back pocket, I’d confidently bet against this system.
Not trying to make grandiose claims about the security of TPM. I just think this scenario was a particularly risky adventure — one which could have feasibility been easier to perform with less risk, had the device come with no capability to decrypt its own data.
I’m imagining something that perhaps micro-batches audio through a
raw_audio - encrypt -> storageprocess, but say every 15 seconds or so. Then transport the encrypted data to a device with decryption keys.