One more step to unhitching from Google…
Right now the only option I see in F-Droid is Aegis.
I’m not sure what to actually look for side from checking for unexpected permissions and reasonably frequent updates.
Hopefully something I can sync with a GNOME app…
I’ve been using KeePassXC. I use Syncthing to keep the database synchronized between computers.
Same here. If it’s TOTP based 2fa, you can keep them in entries and use them from there.
Tbh, if you’re using the same DB for PWs, you’ve successfully downgraded to 1FA now. Except maybe if you use a seperate KeyStick/Yubikey as secret bearer or smth
More like 1.5FA, at least. It still protects against passwords being compromised in any way that doesn’t compromise full access to your password database, which is still a lot better than using just passwords without a second factor.
that’s like calling strong randomly generated passwords 1.5FA.
with proper MFA, even if you steal my password (database), you won’t be able to steal my account, as you’re missing the second factor. with classic otp this is just a single use number you enter on the potentially compromised system, but if you get the seed (secret) stolen, valid numbers can be generated continuously.
password managers (should) protect against reuse. MFA protects against logins on untrusted and potentially compromised systems/keyloggers if they’re not extracted live. password managers with auto fill and phishing resistant MFA can prevent phising, although the password manager variant is still easily bypassed when the user isn’t paying enough attention, as it’s not even that uncommon for login domains to change. obviously there are also other risks on compromised devices, like session cookie exfiltration, and there is a lot of bullshit info around from websites, especially the ones harvesting phone numbers while claiming to require it for 2FA just to gaslight users.
That’s a big leap you’re doing there, equating stealing a password to stealing a password database. Those are very different. Stealing a password can be done through regular phishing, or a host of other methods that don’t require targeted effort. Stealing a password database, if properly set up, is a lot harder than that. It depends of course on what password manager you’re using, but it usually involves multiple factors itself. So equating that to just a password, no matter how strong and random, is just misleading.
Mind you, I agree that it’s less secure than “proper” MFA, and I’m not saying that everybody should just use MFA through a PW manager. I am using physical security keys myself. But for a lot of regular people that otherwise just couldn’t be bothered, it’s absolutely a viable alternative that makes them a whole lot safer for comparatively little effort. Telling them they just shouldn’t bother at all is just going to create more victims. There is no such thing as perfect security, and everyone has a different risk profile.
I would say it still counts as 2fa just shifting what is verifying you to your password manager and using the site password and 2fa as a way to verify the password manager with the site. If setup right they would have to have the database and your password to decrypt it not just one or the other and for password managers that sync the database it should require your password and 2fa to sync to a new device so it can’t just be freely grabbed. If that doesn’t count as 2fa then I would like to see an argument about how okta signing you into sites counts as 2fa as it is basically the same thing.