I’m the Never Ending Pie Throwing Robot, aka NEPTR.

Linux enthusiast, programmer, and privacy advocate. I’m nearly done with an IT Security degree.

TL;DR I am a nerd.

  • 1 Post
  • 400 Comments
Joined 1年前
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Cake day: 2024年11月20日

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  • I guess I just don’t understand your question. Explain in more detail.

    1. Who is the threat actor? (State, APT, Hackivist, etc)
    2. What is their goal (what do they want)? (Money, data, persistent access, blackmail)
    3. What tools do they have?

    Really think about the Ws (who, what, where, when, how).

    If you want to protect against an “advanced” threat actor, you can not do that without multiple layers of isolation, including but not limited to virtualization, MAC (SELinux), namespaces, seccomp.

    All protections are meaningless without a clear understanding of what assets you are protecting, the threat you face, and they want from you.


  • Distrobox is design to be the opposite of confined. Its goal is integration. The container is stripped away as much as possible to allow for sharing host resources.

    As it says on the Distrobox website:

    Security implications

    Isolation and sandboxing are not the main aims of the project, on the contrary it aims to tightly integrate the container with the host. The container will have complete access to your home, pen drive, and so on, so do not expect it to be highly sandboxed like a plain docker/podman container or a Flatpak.

    I would also argue calling “plain docker/podman container or a Flatpak” being “highly sandboxed” is also quite wrong and a misuse of those technology.

    It uses Docker/Podman which is not a security sandbox. The purpose is app containers, not a security boundary. It shares the sane kernel as the host, which makes kernel vulnerabilities a source of container escapes. Docker (the default) runs as root and could be a source of privilege escalation. Best case is use gVisor or SELinux. Still not a secure sandbox.

    Similar problems with Flatpak. Not a secure sandbox. Doesn’t Barely filters syscalls (and in a general way instead of per-app), barely reduces attack surface, granting frequently required permissions often significantly reduces the strength of the sandbox, shares a kernel with the host (and no application kernel like gVisor or sydbox), weak use MAC (like SELinux). Most of this can also be said of the previous 2 container software (and also LXC/LXD/Incus).

    Also, don’t use browsers with Flatpak, they have a significantly weaker sandbox because it is missing a layer of sandboxing (namespaces). This makes attack exponential more likely by reducing the need chain another major vulnerability to execute a successful sandbox break.

    What you want is a VM. It is designed to be a secure sandbox but needs some configuring.











  • Having JS disabled is very rare for non-bot traffic, so you stand out far more. It isn’t about uniqueness, you are already unique if you aren’t using Tor/Mullvad browser(s). While disabling JS protects against certain kinds of fingerprinting, there is pure CSS and TCP fingerprinting. Firefox RFP (eg. Librewolf) and whatever Cromite or Brave have help to protect against much of JS fingerprinting. You are only ever going to fool naive scripts which these browsers already do a good job of that.

    As for security, having JS disabled is a benefit. Just know since you will very likely have to enable to again quite often for random websites, you’ll become used to doing that to the point that it may as well be useless. If a random website doesn’t load just leave it, unless it is worthy of some actual trust. Even more useful would be setting up uBlock Origin with a blocking mode, such as medium or hard.


  • Anything really. Just use Docker/Podman or LXC and then the base OS won’t matter.

    • Ubuntu is still fine
    • Debian I have personally used and it is good
    • I used openSUSE Slowroll for a while as well
    • Fedora server is just as good as RHEL derivatives IMO

    Next thing I am looking at is secureblue for Fedora CoreOS. Security matters and a rock solid base with hardened defaults is really nice. It also is Atomic and because it is effectively just CoreOS, you install it with a JSON file (I think). Using the provided example butane file it took like 30 seconds to install. Now I need to customize it further.





  • I still dont understand /e/OS. Just use LineageOS. It supports all the same devices and doesnt lag as far behind. You can choose to run an insecure OS if you like (see: all Windows 10 users) but definitely don’t recommend it to others.

    You cannot have privacy without at least basic security. Targeted attacks are not the most common kind of attack by long shot. Threat actors scan for vulnerable devices and use automated scripts to execute attacks. Android is one of the most exploited targets. With an outdated OS your browser could be exploited and used to get a sandbox escape, possibly chaining it into root escalation. It all depends on the vulnerabilities found and the longer you wait the more likely for the “stars to align” for the perfect attack. Look at CVE-2025-48593 for an example, zero-click RCE. In recent memory there was also a zero-click RCE utilizing specially crafted MMS, meaning an threat actor could send messages to all phone numbers and try the attack in mass.

    /e/OS is by far the most behind on updating security patch levels of the AOSP ROMs (at ~2 months), iode is ~1 and everything else is better than those two.

    Privacy without security is not real privacy, it is a mirage.

    Security without privacy is like a fortress with cameras inside, a known threat (eg. Gapps Android).

    Privacy with security is like a fortess with no known threats at all (eg. AOSP with timely security patches).

    Privacy without security is like a fortress where some of the locks have rusted through and if someone tries they can open the doors. It is like replacing the walls with cardboard. “No one can spy on me now” you say in your cardboard castle.