TL;DR The only way to avoid a near unique fingerprint is Tor Browser

Longer explanation: There are too many styles of fingerprinting protections: randomized and normalized.

Librewolf inherits its fingerprint protections from Firefox (which intern was upstreamed from the Tor uplift project. It works by taking as many fingerprintable characteristics (refresh rate, canvas, resolution, theme, timezone, etc) and normalizes them to a static value to be shared by all browsers using the feature (privacy.resistFingerprinting in about:config). The benefit of normalizing is you appear more generic, though there are many limitations (biggest of which is OS because you cant hide that). The purpose design of these protections stems from the anonymization strategy of Tor which is to blend in with all other users so no individual can be differentiated based on identifiers. Since Librewolf has different a default settings profile to Tor (or Mullvad) and even vanilla Firefox with RFP enabled, the best you can hope is to blend in with other Librewolf users (which you really cant, especially if you install extensions or change [some] specific settings). Instead, the goal is just to fool naive fingerprinting scripts, nation states or any skilled adversary is out of the scope.

Brave (or Cromite) uses the strategy of randomizing fingerprintable characteristics. This is only meant to fool naive FP scripts but in my opinion (when done right) is better at fooling naive scripts. The biggest problem is that these attempts by other browsers and not as comprehensive as Firefox. I think Cromite does a better job than Brave: it is the only browser which fools Creepjs that I have tried by creating a new FP on refresh. Cromite required some configuring to get to place I wanted it, but so does every browser.

The advantage with Firefox forks is that vanilla Firefox has RFP and therefore so do the forks (though most dont enable), but you dont blend i with a crowd (making it far less effective than MB or Tor). The advantage of Brave or Cromite is a randomized FP, bit since it isnt upstreamed (and Google will never do that) you stand out like a sore thumb. Either way is fine though for basically everyone.

The only browsers I know that work against Creepjs are as follows:

• Mullvad (persistent FP)
• Tor (persistent FP)
• Cromite (randomized FP)

Because of federation they are probably un-deletable. Most likely federated to multiple servers.

And it’s Linus’s distro of choice.

Screensharing is the only thing i dont think it does. Voice and video good. See snikket or conversations.im

They have the best ARM CPUs in any consumer product and very good software/hardware security. I hate Apple because their shit is overpriced and locked-down but that doesnt mean its garbage.

Same problem pretty sure.

Snap has a far better permission system and avoids many of the security pitfalls of Flatpak, but it being hardcoded to use Canonical’s proprietary server is BS. Also forcing people to use Snap is BS.

It is a denial of service attack. He discloses all vulnerabilities ahead of time. The only reason he released the previous one so quickly is because the Matrix team said it “wasnt a real vulnerability”.

Understood.

It seems that forward secrecy is still in development from the blog you showed.

I still wouldnt use session for the reasons stated in this Soatok’s (a cryptographer) blogs. Even if they fix(ed) these problems, I have no trust for their security implementations. Why use session instead of something like Briar?

https://soatok.blog/2025/01/14/dont-use-session-signal-fork/ https://soatok.blog/2025/01/20/session-round-2/

People keep finding significant vulnerabilities in its cryptography and the Matrix team tries to deflect or create strawmans for why it isnt actually a vuln. Soatok found a vulnerability in 2024 by just browsing the source code for tiny bit of time, and again just two weeks ago after looking for a couple hours. In both cases, Matrix then responded to his vuln report with hostility, saying it wasnt actually a vulnerability. He is sitting on another vulnerability.

Having a cleartext mode is a security downgrade and no secure messenger should support cleartext. It only barely got functional forward secrecy recently. VoIP in most Matrix clients (and servers) still use Jitsi backend which isn’t E2EE, even with the release of the newer (secure) Element call protocol. Matrix leaks tons of metadata, such as usernames, room names, emoji reactions, generate URL embedded previews. Rooms arent encrypted by default. It is also a UX nightmare and often times you cant decrypt your messages.

Matrix is not secure. You’d be better off with XMPP and OMEMO which has its own problems and isn’t secure either. Sill better than Matrix.

Session is a security downgrade. It doesnt support forward secrecy which is hella important.

Also the repo image

Yes, I understand what GVisor does. Cgroups2 are for isolation of system resources, bit arent even the main sandbox feature used for isolation by Docker. I am pretty sure namespaces significantly more important for these containers’ security.

GVisor helps with one of the main risks in a container setup which is the shared kernel by hosts and guests. I understand it comes with a performance penalty (and I didnt know it was incompatible with SELinux), but that does change my original point that GVisor is a security improvement to default Docker. I understand there is more nuance, even when I wrote my original comment I understood (just like any other security feature) it cant be used in every scenario. I was being intentionally general, and in my second comment I was pretty specific about what it protects against: Kernel vulnerabilities and privilege escalation.

I researched cgroups2 more and I still dont understand why you brought it up in the first place. Cgroups2 and gvisor provide very different security benefits. Cgroups help to keep a system available (lessening the risk DoS attacks) by controlling access to some system resources (io, devices, cpu, memory) and grouping processes of a similar type. It seems rather optimized to solve resource control on a container host. I mentioned gvisor because it is mostly just a drop-in replacement container runtime which doesnt need setup to be used.s

Now for a different container runtime which provides significantly more features (than gvisor) with less downsides (if configured correctly for a specific workload), Sydbox provides syd-oci which id an application kernel runtime which uses a permission config file to create a sandbox, isolating using namespaces, seccomp, landlock, and more. It can sandbox in many different categories (often times leveraging multiple features to provide a multilayer sandbox), you can see the categories at the syd manpage. The biggest downside is that you must really understand what your container application needs otherwise it will prevent it from running. It is a “secure by-default” sandbox which can be softened through config.

I dont really understand what you mean in your last sentence.

My reason for saying GVisor is safer is because it is an application kernel which provides traps and emulates most Linux syscalls in the guest with a far smaller set of syscalls to the host kernel, helping to prevent container escapes and privilege escalation. GVisor also fully drops privileges early into start up (before running any significant logic), helping to prevent privilege escalation.

Cgroups is not a really a security feature (from what I understand). It is about controlling process priority, hierarchy, and resources limiting (among other things). You can not use GVisor with LXC.

Here are some, though they def spammed more communities:

!foss@beehaw.org !privacy@lemmy.dbzer0.com !linux@lemmy.world !linux@lemmy.ml

It was posted in like 5 different communities, some not even close to related (for example 3 Linux communities), some posted twice (eg. the Linux previously mentioned communities). They could have just crossposted it using the feature. Either way it is still a lot of spam. It isnt even that important of news because anyone who cares about this (anti or pro LLM) has already made up their mind and would already have formed an opinion on this feature without a random article.

The UI is proprietary.

In order of most to least secure

VM > Docker+GVisor > Docker/LXC

Docker+GVisor is good middle ground because it provides the guest container with an application kernel in a memory safe language and reduced syscall attack surface to avoid kernel container escapes. Docker/LXC share the kernel with the host.

They disregard the risk from the vendor because you are already using their hardware. The hardware has firmware already included which is proprietary, the hardware itself is proprietary, and hardware effectively runs as root anyways. You should already trust your hardware or you shouldn’t be using it. Linux-libre is a purity test, that is it. It is security theater which actually, definitely, really makes you vulnerable without doing anything meaningful. The only time it makes any sense is if you only use open source hardware.