You would enjoy a part of this essay talking about the Airline’s experience dealing with automation:

They realised that many pilots flying highly automated jets were becoming what Vanderburgh called “Children of the Magenta Line”.

But you see, we have become what I call children of the magenta. [Note: In modern cockpits, the magenta line is the brightly colored route shown on the flight display, a digital path generated by the navigation computer.] You know, we think we have to have those magenta lines on the map and that magenta V-bar that’s steering us toward that line, or for some reason, the plane won’t fly.

…

That’s why his core message is:

We are not automation managers. We are captains and pilots, and by our aviator skills, we are to ensure the vertical and lateral path of these planes at all times. We will use the wonderful tools of automation that have been provided to us to help us with that task. But when the automation is not maintaining the intended flight path, we will turn it off and maintain the path by our skills.

Automation excels in routine situations, but it can’t improvise when things go wrong. In Vanderburgh’s words:

Automation lacks the ability to create flexible responses to unanticipated changes in flight path requirements. So in these circumstances, a lower level of automation should lower workload and thereby preclude us from becoming task-saturated and losing our situation awareness.

It’s an interesting historical frame of this AI automation downward spiral you describe.