I want to make it clear, I am aware the Soviets had incredible technology that the west did not even have, at least for a time. My point regarding China’s Socialist Market Economy is that the process of technology transfer happens faster, more completely, and is now being phased out in favor of new Chinese tech that in many fields is advanced beyond the west. China’s socialist market economy is not a permanent strategy, but instead a tactical decision in a longer battle, and that’s why the birdcage is closing.
As for the cornered beast, I am referring to America. Russia certainly has a real need to return to socialism, but America is the one on its way out. And yes, the hatred of America is real, even liberals are beginning to detest America (though of course they will repeat nonsense about communism until they turn blue in the face). The Empire is dying. It can certainly lash out violently, but it cannot and will not save itself.
I want to make it clear, I am aware the Soviets had incredible technology that the west did not even have, at least for a time. My point regarding China’s Socialist Market Economy is that the process of technology transfer happens faster, more completely, and is now being phased out in favor of new Chinese tech that in many fields is advanced beyond the west.
I understand everything you’re saying, but that’s not what I’m getting at. If the USSR had received the same level of Western investment back then—the kind that was poured into China—it wouldn’t have been any worse off; in fact, to be more precise, the USSR would have absolutely skyrocketed.
As for the cornered beast, I am referring to America.
I am more concerned about European globalists right now—because I am not from Iran, but from Kharkiv.
And those scumbags are constantly provoking… harder and harder.
One could say that the reason the Soviets could not get the same western investment is because of the differences between the soviet system and the Chinese system. This is why it’s best not to look at socialism like a static formula, but a science with options and tradeoffs. China’s decision came with good and bad, the soviet decision came with good and bad, the correct decision is only truly identifiable in hindsight.
One could say that the reason the Soviets could not get the same western investment is because of the differences between the soviet system and the Chinese system.
Specifically for our conversation, I would like to briefly introduce you—in outline form—to the contents of Yuri Nikolayevich Zhukov’s book, The Flip Side of NEP (Обратная Сторона НЭПа):
Crisis Phenomena: According to the researcher, the partial return to market mechanisms did not lead to the long-awaited economic boom; instead, it triggered a protracted economic crisis.
Political Struggle: The transition to the NEP (New Economic Policy) exacerbated latent conflicts within the USSR’s party elite (during the 1923–1925 period), resulting in a fierce struggle for power.
Social Stratification: Economic liberalization led to the rapid enrichment of a narrow social stratum—the “NEPmen”—a situation that stood in stark contrast to the dire plight of the majority of workers and peasants.
As you can see, there exists a radically different perspective on the events of that era. Zhukov is an archivist; his work relies primarily on archival documents. In his books, every claim is substantiated by the figures and statistical indicators of those years, which form the core of the economic analysis within his work. The political struggle is evidenced in the minutes of party meetings, while social stratification is clearly visible in criminal police reports. One such report, for instance, describes the formation of a student gang in Moscow that specialized in robbing NEPmen. A great number of such motley gangs sprang up, triggering a rampant surge in crime.
Indeed, we know that between 1919 and 1921, “War Communism” was implemented at the behest of Trotsky. Both Trotsky and Lenin indulged in fantasies of a global revolution; they fully expected that a wave of socialist revolutions would erupt across Europe at any moment, and that the Red Army would immediately rush to their aid. Consequently, the army was effectively transformed into a “labor army.”
It was a truly terrible time for the workers and peasants. Soldiers were not demobilized from the army; instead, they remained under barracks conditions, working in factories and receiving no wages—only food and clothing. Yet, even these basic necessities the state was unable to provide in sufficient quantities. As the situation deteriorated, unrest and strikes began to erupt in the factories; workers refused to work. Measures had to be taken.
To breathe some fresh life into the economy, War Communism was abolished and the NEP was introduced; however, as it turned out, this dawn was short-lived. As for the notion that the NEP was actually effective in the USSR—that was a myth later inflated by Gorbachev in order to push through his own hare-brained ideas.
Let’s set everything else aside for a moment and focus solely on the construction of socialism via the “Stalinist path.” We will take into account all the errors, miscalculations, and successes involved.
How did Stalin attract investment? Stalin sold priceless paintings from the state-owned Hermitage Museum, thereby effectively bribing American officials and tycoons. Capitalizing on the Weimar Republic’s diplomatic isolation, he established trade relations with them. Raw materials were shipped to the Weimar Republic, while technology, equipment, machinery, and machine tools flowed back in return. At that time, Germany was a technologically advanced nation. However, problems arose in the 1930s; Hitler rose to power, and relations between the USSR and Germany were severed. Simultaneously, an unprecedented economic crisis struck. Trade relations with Europe and the USA were all but reduced to zero. As always, the peasants ended up bearing the brunt of the consequences. The 1930s were an incredibly difficult period for the peasantry. There were also miscalculations regarding collectivization—specifically, those that followed the failure of the communes. In case you weren’t aware, prior to collectivization, there had been communes established in the villages. That particular approach failed miserably, sparking intense resentment among the peasants. Yet Mao—for some inexplicable reason—chose to emphasize communes rather than kolkhozes (collective farms) during his “Great Leap Forward,” completely disregarding Stalin’s prior experience.
And do not forget that, running parallel to the processes of collectivization and industrialization, a “Cultural Revolution” was taking place within the USSR. And believe me, Comrade: had Mao orchestrated something similar, China would not have suffered from such a dire shortage of agricultural specialists.
After Mao botched the industrialization, collectivization, and “Cultural Revolution”—and subsequently fell out with the USSR—China was forced to go to the West with cap in hand, begging for aid. Had it not been for American assistance back then, China would have simply collapsed!
Stalin also made errors and mistakes in socialist construction. You are overweighting Mao’s mistakes and ignoring the successes under Mao, the establishment and solidification of socialism in China. The modern CPC has learned from both the successes and mistakes of both Stalin and Mao, while the CPSU decayed. As much as I wish the USSR had not dissolved, it did, and we are in the aftermath of such a tragedy.
Stalin also made errors and mistakes in socialist construction.
I’m not arguing.
You are overweighting Mao’s mistakes and ignoring the successes under Mao
I can offer my perspective from where I stand—which, as always, is a bit different…
You overestimate Mao’s achievements while underestimating the assistance provided by the USSR.
You always focus on Mao’s post-war accomplishments, yet you fail to mention his contributions during the wars against Japan and in the Civil War—periods when he truly demonstrated the full extent of his capabilities, thereby providing the impetus for the unification of China. This is, undeniably, a monumental achievement on his part. His shortcomings and lack of foresight, however, lay in his incompetence regarding economic theory, as well as his subsequent handling of industrial and agrarian policies.
The abrupt pivot toward the West was not a continuation of Mao’s strategy, but rather a forced measure—a desperate attempt to rescue an economy that had reached a complete dead end. After all, selling one’s soul to the devil is always the very last resort.
I am not undervaluing Mao’s work in liberation, on that front I agree. I am disagreeing with you regarding the merits of Mao’s economic practices, which ultimately did lay the groundwork for Reform and Opening Up. The Sino-Soviet split was a tragedy, indeed, but China nevertheless is carrying the banner of socialism forward today.
I am disagreeing with you regarding the merits of Mao’s economic practices, which ultimately did lay the groundwork for Reform and Opening Up.
A comrade forwarded this video to me today.
The speaker is a former CIA officer. See for yourself what that “openness” actually meant.
I repeat once more, Comrade: that was not openness, but a CIA operation—staged against the backdrop of escalating tensions between the USSR and China. The U.S. simply took advantage of the situation.
A comrade forwarded me this video today.
The speaker is a former CIA officer. See for yourself what that “openness” actually meant.
I repeat once more, Comrade: that was not openness, but a CIA operation—staged against the backdrop of escalating tensions between the USSR and China. The U.S. simply capitalized on the situation.
And this is not the first time I have pointed out your double standards and contradictions!
Why won’t you listen to me?
I repeat once again:
The criticism of Joseph Stalin—specifically, of his cult of personality—contained in Khrushchev’s report at the conclusion of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, along with the new Soviet course toward economic development under a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist nations, provoked Mao Zedong’s displeasure, as he viewed them as running counter to the concept of the “Leninist sword” and to communist ideology as a whole.
By the way, read this too: the CIA had a hand in it as well—the bastards!
I want to make it clear, I am aware the Soviets had incredible technology that the west did not even have, at least for a time. My point regarding China’s Socialist Market Economy is that the process of technology transfer happens faster, more completely, and is now being phased out in favor of new Chinese tech that in many fields is advanced beyond the west. China’s socialist market economy is not a permanent strategy, but instead a tactical decision in a longer battle, and that’s why the birdcage is closing.
As for the cornered beast, I am referring to America. Russia certainly has a real need to return to socialism, but America is the one on its way out. And yes, the hatred of America is real, even liberals are beginning to detest America (though of course they will repeat nonsense about communism until they turn blue in the face). The Empire is dying. It can certainly lash out violently, but it cannot and will not save itself.
I understand everything you’re saying, but that’s not what I’m getting at. If the USSR had received the same level of Western investment back then—the kind that was poured into China—it wouldn’t have been any worse off; in fact, to be more precise, the USSR would have absolutely skyrocketed.
I am more concerned about European globalists right now—because I am not from Iran, but from Kharkiv.
And those scumbags are constantly provoking… harder and harder.
One could say that the reason the Soviets could not get the same western investment is because of the differences between the soviet system and the Chinese system. This is why it’s best not to look at socialism like a static formula, but a science with options and tradeoffs. China’s decision came with good and bad, the soviet decision came with good and bad, the correct decision is only truly identifiable in hindsight.
Specifically for our conversation, I would like to briefly introduce you—in outline form—to the contents of Yuri Nikolayevich Zhukov’s book, The Flip Side of NEP (Обратная Сторона НЭПа):
Crisis Phenomena: According to the researcher, the partial return to market mechanisms did not lead to the long-awaited economic boom; instead, it triggered a protracted economic crisis.
Political Struggle: The transition to the NEP (New Economic Policy) exacerbated latent conflicts within the USSR’s party elite (during the 1923–1925 period), resulting in a fierce struggle for power.
Social Stratification: Economic liberalization led to the rapid enrichment of a narrow social stratum—the “NEPmen”—a situation that stood in stark contrast to the dire plight of the majority of workers and peasants.
As you can see, there exists a radically different perspective on the events of that era. Zhukov is an archivist; his work relies primarily on archival documents. In his books, every claim is substantiated by the figures and statistical indicators of those years, which form the core of the economic analysis within his work. The political struggle is evidenced in the minutes of party meetings, while social stratification is clearly visible in criminal police reports. One such report, for instance, describes the formation of a student gang in Moscow that specialized in robbing NEPmen. A great number of such motley gangs sprang up, triggering a rampant surge in crime.
Indeed, we know that between 1919 and 1921, “War Communism” was implemented at the behest of Trotsky. Both Trotsky and Lenin indulged in fantasies of a global revolution; they fully expected that a wave of socialist revolutions would erupt across Europe at any moment, and that the Red Army would immediately rush to their aid. Consequently, the army was effectively transformed into a “labor army.”
It was a truly terrible time for the workers and peasants. Soldiers were not demobilized from the army; instead, they remained under barracks conditions, working in factories and receiving no wages—only food and clothing. Yet, even these basic necessities the state was unable to provide in sufficient quantities. As the situation deteriorated, unrest and strikes began to erupt in the factories; workers refused to work. Measures had to be taken. To breathe some fresh life into the economy, War Communism was abolished and the NEP was introduced; however, as it turned out, this dawn was short-lived. As for the notion that the NEP was actually effective in the USSR—that was a myth later inflated by Gorbachev in order to push through his own hare-brained ideas.
Let’s set everything else aside for a moment and focus solely on the construction of socialism via the “Stalinist path.” We will take into account all the errors, miscalculations, and successes involved.
How did Stalin attract investment? Stalin sold priceless paintings from the state-owned Hermitage Museum, thereby effectively bribing American officials and tycoons. Capitalizing on the Weimar Republic’s diplomatic isolation, he established trade relations with them. Raw materials were shipped to the Weimar Republic, while technology, equipment, machinery, and machine tools flowed back in return. At that time, Germany was a technologically advanced nation. However, problems arose in the 1930s; Hitler rose to power, and relations between the USSR and Germany were severed. Simultaneously, an unprecedented economic crisis struck. Trade relations with Europe and the USA were all but reduced to zero. As always, the peasants ended up bearing the brunt of the consequences. The 1930s were an incredibly difficult period for the peasantry. There were also miscalculations regarding collectivization—specifically, those that followed the failure of the communes. In case you weren’t aware, prior to collectivization, there had been communes established in the villages. That particular approach failed miserably, sparking intense resentment among the peasants. Yet Mao—for some inexplicable reason—chose to emphasize communes rather than kolkhozes (collective farms) during his “Great Leap Forward,” completely disregarding Stalin’s prior experience.
And do not forget that, running parallel to the processes of collectivization and industrialization, a “Cultural Revolution” was taking place within the USSR. And believe me, Comrade: had Mao orchestrated something similar, China would not have suffered from such a dire shortage of agricultural specialists.
After Mao botched the industrialization, collectivization, and “Cultural Revolution”—and subsequently fell out with the USSR—China was forced to go to the West with cap in hand, begging for aid. Had it not been for American assistance back then, China would have simply collapsed!
Stalin also made errors and mistakes in socialist construction. You are overweighting Mao’s mistakes and ignoring the successes under Mao, the establishment and solidification of socialism in China. The modern CPC has learned from both the successes and mistakes of both Stalin and Mao, while the CPSU decayed. As much as I wish the USSR had not dissolved, it did, and we are in the aftermath of such a tragedy.
I’m not arguing.
I can offer my perspective from where I stand—which, as always, is a bit different…
You overestimate Mao’s achievements while underestimating the assistance provided by the USSR.
You always focus on Mao’s post-war accomplishments, yet you fail to mention his contributions during the wars against Japan and in the Civil War—periods when he truly demonstrated the full extent of his capabilities, thereby providing the impetus for the unification of China. This is, undeniably, a monumental achievement on his part. His shortcomings and lack of foresight, however, lay in his incompetence regarding economic theory, as well as his subsequent handling of industrial and agrarian policies.
The abrupt pivot toward the West was not a continuation of Mao’s strategy, but rather a forced measure—a desperate attempt to rescue an economy that had reached a complete dead end. After all, selling one’s soul to the devil is always the very last resort.
I am not undervaluing Mao’s work in liberation, on that front I agree. I am disagreeing with you regarding the merits of Mao’s economic practices, which ultimately did lay the groundwork for Reform and Opening Up. The Sino-Soviet split was a tragedy, indeed, but China nevertheless is carrying the banner of socialism forward today.
A comrade forwarded this video to me today.
The speaker is a former CIA officer. See for yourself what that “openness” actually meant.
I repeat once more, Comrade: that was not openness, but a CIA operation—staged against the backdrop of escalating tensions between the USSR and China. The U.S. simply took advantage of the situation.
A comrade forwarded me this video today.
The speaker is a former CIA officer. See for yourself what that “openness” actually meant.
I repeat once more, Comrade: that was not openness, but a CIA operation—staged against the backdrop of escalating tensions between the USSR and China. The U.S. simply capitalized on the situation.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=xVVyS7NtB5k
And this is not the first time I have pointed out your double standards and contradictions!
Why won’t you listen to me?
I repeat once again:
The criticism of Joseph Stalin—specifically, of his cult of personality—contained in Khrushchev’s report at the conclusion of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, along with the new Soviet course toward economic development under a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist nations, provoked Mao Zedong’s displeasure, as he viewed them as running counter to the concept of the “Leninist sword” and to communist ideology as a whole.
By the way, read this too: the CIA had a hand in it as well—the bastards!
https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000242669.pdf