Intermediate certs allow anyone to mint web credentials for any Internet server.

Astonishingly, the private keys were 4, 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.

exploiting compromised certificates requires an active adversary-in-the-middle attack, meaning the attacker must act as a proxy between two TLS parties and receive encrypted traffic, decrypt it, reencrypt it, and send it to the other party. Such capabilities, in some cases, are usually limited to only the most well-resourced attackers. People with control of a local network—at a coffee shop, university, or other organization—face much less of a challenge.

https://emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com/

Xkcd 221: int getRandomNumber() { return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll. guaranteed to be random. }

  • Aatube@lemmy.dbzer0.comOP
    1·
    9 hours ago

    none of these intermediate CAs, including the one deployed in production, have issued any end-entity certificates. This has been confirmed through our internal analysis and corroborated by publicly available Certificate Transparency records on crt.sh.

    —https://emudhra.com/en/post/certificate-security-incident

    so no, there is no “traffic using the specific keys that leaked” and hence your attack wouldn’t yield anything, but one could use these certificates to reencrypt and impersonate

    i’ll also note that you excluded the last sentence of the paragraph you quoted, which makes clear that “some cases” refers to cases other than the case at hand