• ExLisper@lemmy.curiana.net
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    2 days ago

    One thing I don’t understand…

    So if a bad actor gets access to one of the intermediate CA certificates they can run all sorts of MITM attacks, right? What are the chances that government agencies don’t have a bunch of private keys from CA that are not obviously wrong? 0, right? So we should just assume that government agencies can do MITM whenever they want?

    • marcos@lemmy.world
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      2 days ago

      Yes, government agencies can do MITM whenever they want.

      Also, take a look at the remote management functionality of your computer.

    • Supercrunchy@programming.dev
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      2 days ago

      It’s actually possible to prevent impersonation:

      In theory all the generated keys are added to a public certificate transparancy log. Browsers should check that the key is there (but your http client library probably doesn’t - and this is why these compromised keys are a problem).

      Website owners should also check that there are no other certificates in there, and if they see an extra misissued certificate something went really wrong at a CA and that CA would probably lose all the credibility and trust.

      Also when you request a certificate the CA doesn’t get your private keys, so they can’t reuse your cert.

      Example: https://ctlogs.dev/search?q=Programming.dev

      • ExLisper@lemmy.curiana.net
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        2 days ago

        Yes, but if it’s not used for a website but VPN for example. If NSA got a private key from some compromised CA and did MITM on some VPN users, would anyone notice?