- cross-posted to:
- boycottus@lemmy.ca
- cross-posted to:
- boycottus@lemmy.ca
As evidence, the lawsuit cites unnamed “courageous whistleblowers” who allege that WhatsApp and Meta employees can request to view a user’s messages through a simple process, thus bypassing the app’s end-to-end encryption. “A worker need only send a ‘task’ (i.e., request via Meta’s internal system) to a Meta engineer with an explanation that they need access to WhatsApp messages for their job,” the lawsuit claims. “The Meta engineering team will then grant access – often without any scrutiny at all – and the worker’s workstation will then have a new window or widget available that can pull up any WhatsApp user’s messages based on the user’s User ID number, which is unique to a user but identical across all Meta products.”
“Once the Meta worker has this access, they can read users’ messages by opening the widget; no separate decryption step is required,” the 51-page complaint adds. “The WhatsApp messages appear in widgets commingled with widgets containing messages from unencrypted sources. Messages appear almost as soon as they are communicated – essentially, in real-time. Moreover, access is unlimited in temporal scope, with Meta workers able to access messages from the time users first activated their accounts, including those messages users believe they have deleted.” The lawsuit does not provide any technical details to back up the rather sensational claims.
If I am not adding my own private key to the app, like in Tox, I don’t trust their encryption.
What’s to stop an evil company uploading the keys as soon as you enter them in the App? It certainly wouldn’t stop Meta.
What’s stopping the app from keeping your private key and still not encrypting anything?
I’m not trying to be difficult here, I just don’t see how anything outside of an application whose source you can check yourself can be trusted.
All applications hosted by other people require you to react positively to “just trust me bro”.
Or, if the app has the private key for decryption for the user to be able to see the messages, what’s stopping the app from copying that decrypted text somewhere else?
The thread model isn’t usually key management, it’s more about the insecure treatment of the decrypted message after decryption.
Tox also isn’t that great security wise. It’s hard to beat Signal when it comes to security messengers. And Signal is open source so
Well, Whatsapp uses signal. Bad timing
It only uses some of signal’s code. Not necessarily the OOTB key storage and security.
How?
WhatsApp is using Signals protocol for communication: https://signal.org/blog/whatsapp-complete/
I don’t fully understand what it entails, but from what I understand is that yes, WhatsApp is using the same encryption and message flow that signal uses, but you’re still using Meta’s app, and they can just read the plaintext message from there.
Or they can make a copy of the encryption keys on creation. Using the code is very different than using the code unedited, or using all the code.
To my knowledge, under Signal, the encription keys are locally generated and stored, and the traffic flows between end points as a closed packet.
This does not seem to be the case here, as the keys are generated and stored outside your equipment and, thus, are viable to be used by a third party to access packets.
But I admit I speak heavily burdened by technical ignorance.
My understanding is they’re sending a request to your device that then decrypts and uploads messages, not storing the keys outside your device.
that’s incorrect. with whatsapp, your keys are stored on meta servers (the same as things like imessage). they can simply decrypt them whenever they like, just like being signed in as you. it’s completely invisible to your client
Ewwwwwwww
Unless proof is given, assume troll
Man, you just brought back memories. I forgot qtox was even a thing. I think I still have my profile saved in my dev folder somewhere for my account